Alice is a charismatic quantum cryptographer who believes her parties are unmissable; Bob is a 1 glamorous string theorist who believes he is an indispensable guest. To prevent possibly traumatic collisions of self-perception and reality, their social code requires that decisions about invitation or acceptance be made via a cryptographically secure variable bias coin toss (VBCT). This generates a shared random bit by the toss of a coin whose bias is secretly chosen, within a stipulated range, by one of the parties; the other party learns only the random bit. Thus one party can secretly influence the outcome, while both can save face by blaming any negative decisions on bad luck.
I. INTRODUCTION A. Background
The discoveries of quantum cryptography [1] and provably secure quantum key distribution [2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ] motivated a general search for protocols which implement interesting cryptographic tasks in a way that can be guaranteed secure by quantum theory (for example [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17] ), by the impossibility of superluminal signalling [18, 19, 20] , or both. The full cryptographic power of these physical principles is presently unknown: ideally, one would like to generate either a provably secure protocol or a no-go theorem for every interesting task.
There are at least three significant types of cryptographic security which apply to protocols based on physics:
1. Unconditional security, where the impossibility of useful cheating (i.e. learning private information or influencing the outcome of the protocol beyond what is permitted by an honest input) is guaranteed by the laws of physics.
2. Cheat-evident security, where at least one party can usefully cheat, but the laws of physics guarantee that any cheating will eventually be detected with certainty.
3. Cheat-sensitive security [14, 15, 16] , where at least one party can usefully cheat, but the laws of physics guarantee that any such cheating will be detected with non-zero probability.
In this paper, we focus mainly on unconditional security, but also consider an interesting cheat-evident protocol. We follow the standard convention that a protocol is secure provided that it protects honest parties from cheats. Thus, for the two-party protocols considered here, we do not require that a protocol offers any protection if both parties cheat. Instead, we simply guarantee to each party that if they follow the protocol as prescribed, they will be protected. To be more precise, the parties are guaranteed protection against useful cheating. It is not necessary in mistrustful cryptography to prevent every possible kind of deviation from a protocol. What is required is some form of guarantee that any deviations which go undetected give no advantage to the party who deviates: i.e. that the deviating party gains no unauthorized information about the other party's inputs and no illegitimate influence over the protocol's outcome. For example, in a relativistic coin tossing protocol in which the parties are supposed to independently supply random bits a and b and the coin toss outcome is c = a ⊕ b, there is no way to guarantee to A that B's bit b was genuinely randomly chosen (or vice versa). However, this does not matter: as long as at least one party is honest, the outcome c is random. Thus, though an honest party has no guarantee that they will detect all deviations from the protocol by the other party, they do have a guarantee that, if the protocol produces a coin toss outcome, it will be fair.
Most work on quantum cryptography to date has considered non-relativistic protocols, in which the parties' locations are completely unconstrained and their communications may effectively be assumed instantaneous. However, for at least two important tasks, strong coin tossing and bit commitment, we know that protocols which rely on the impossibility of superluminal signalling are more powerful than their non-relativistic counterparts. Strong coin tossing -in which two mistrustful parties want to create a shared random bit whose randomness is guaranteed -is trivial to implement using relativistic signalling constraints (see e.g. Ref. [21] ), but cannot be securely implemented using non-relativistic protocols [8, 22] . Non-relativistic quantum bit commitment has also been shown to be impossible [23, 24, 25] . On the other hand, there exist relativistic protocols [18, 19] which are (unlike any non-relativistic protocol) provably secure against classical attacks [19] , and also provably immune to Mayers-Lo-Chau attacks [19] : it is conjectured that they are also secure against general quantum attacks.
Relativistic protocols require each party to be able to send and receive communications from at least two separated locations. The separation between an individual party's communication devices must be considerably greater than the separation between their device and the other party's nearest device. For instance, if Alice uses locations A 1 and A 2 and Bob uses locations B 1 and B 2 , the distance d(A 1 , A 2 ) must be considerably greater than d(A 1 , B 1 ) and d(A 2 , B 2 ).
Using quantum communications and storing and manipulating quantum states in order to implement a cryptographic protocol is clearly an inconvenience: quantum technology seems likely to be more costly and less robust than its classical counterpart for the foreseeable future. The constraints imposed by relativistic protocols may also in some circumstances be a significant inconvenience. For example, if two parties occupy small secure sites which are widely separated, and trust nothing outside their secure sites, they cannot run a relativistic protocol securely without relocating or extending their sites. Of course, in both cases, the compensating advantage is a guarantee of unconditional security which cannot be obtained by other means. It is also worth stressing that relativistic protocols do not require either party to trust that the other is located where they claim to be: each party can guarantee security by knowing their own locations and by recording the times at which they send and receive signals. Nor does relativistic cryptography necessarily require large-scale separation: in principle, two parties could implement a relativistic protocol by placing two credit card sized secure devices next to one another.
B. Secure computation
The main focus of this paper is to consider protocols for the task of variable bias coin tossing (VBCT) between two parties. Roughly speaking -we give precise definitions below -a secure VBCT protocol generates a shared random bit as though by a biased coin, whose bias is secretly chosen by one of the parties to take some value within a prescribed range. This is the simplest case of the more general task of carrying out a variable bias n-faced die roll, in which one of n possible outcomes is randomly generated as though by a biased die, whose bias (i.e. list of outcome probabilities) is secretly chosen by one of the parties to take some value within a prescribed convex set. Variable bias coin tossing and die rolling are themselves special cases of secure two-party computations. To understand their significance, it is helpful to locate them within a general classification of secure computation tasks.
A general secure classical computation involves N parties, labelled by i in the range 1 ≤ i ≤ N , who each have some input, x i , and wish to compute some (possibly non-deterministic) functions of their inputs, with the i-th party receiving as output f i (x 1 , . . . , x N ). We call this a classical computation because the inputs and outputs are classical, although we allow such computations to be implemented by protocols which involve the processing of quantum states. All of the computations we consider in this paper are classical in this sense (although most of the protocols we discuss involve quantum information processing), so we will henceforth refer simply to computations, with the term "classical" taken as understood. A perfectly secure computation guarantees, for each i, each subset J ⊆ {1, . . . , N }, and each set of possible inputs x i and {x j } j∈J , that if the parties J do indeed input {x j } j∈J and then collaborate, they can gain no more information about the input x i than what is implied by {x j } j∈J and {f j (x 1 , . . . , x N )} j∈J .
We restrict attention here to two types of two-party computation: two-sided computations in which the outputs prescribed for each party are identical, and one-sided computations in which one party gets no output. We use the term single function computations to cover both of these types, since in both cases only one function need be evaluated. We can classify single function computations by the number of inputs, by whether they are deterministic or random, and by whether one or two parties receive the output.
We are interested in protocols whose unconditional security is guaranteed by the laws of physics. In particular, as is standard in these discussions, we do not allow any security arguments based on technological or computational bounds: each party allows for the possibility that the other may have arbitrarily good technology and arbitrarily powerful quantum computers. Nor do we allow any reliance on mutually trusted third parties or devices. We also make the standard assumptions that Alice and Bob are the only participants in the protocol -i.e. that there is no interference by third parties -and that they have noiseless communication channels. The known results for secure computations are summarized below.
Zero-input computations:
Secure protocols for zero-input deterministic computations or zero-input random one-sided computations can be trivially constructed, since the relevant computations can be carried out by one or both parties separately. The most general type of zero-input two-sided random secure computation is a biased nfaced secure die roll. This can be implemented with unconditional security by generalizing the well-known relativistic protocol for a secure coin toss (see e.g. Ref. [21] ).
One-input computations: Secure protocols for deterministic one-input computations are trivial; the party making the input can always choose it to generate any desired output on the other side, so might as well compute the function on their own and send the output directly to the other party.
The non-deterministic case is of interest. For one-sided computations, where the output goes to the party that did not make the input, the most general function is a one-sided variable bias n-faced die roll. The input simply defines a probability distribution over the outputs. In essence, one party chooses one from a collection of biased n-faced dice to roll (the members of the collection are known to both parties). The output of the roll goes to one party only, who has no other information about which die was chosen.
It is known that some computations of this type are impossible. A special case of these computations defines a version of oblivious transfer (OT), in which Alice inputs a bit, Bob inputs nothing, Bob receives Alice's bit with probability half, and otherwise receives the outcome fail. Rudolph [26] has shown that no non-relativistic quantum protocol can securely implement this task, and his argument trivially generalizes to the relativistic case.
The two-sided case of a non-deterministic one-input function we call a variable bias n-faced die roll. This -and particularly the two-faced case, a variable bias coin toss -is the subject of the present paper. We will give a protocol that implements the task with unconditional security for a limited range of biases, another which implements any range of biases, but achieves only cheat-evident security, and two further protocols that allow any range of biases and which we conjecture are unconditionally secure.
Two-input computations: Lo [12] considered the task of finding a secure non-relativistic quantum protocol for a two-input, deterministic, one-sided function. He showed that if the protocol allows Alice to input i, Bob to input j, and Bob to receive f (i, j), while giving Alice no information on j, then Bob can also obtain f (i, j ′ ) for all j ′ . For any cryptographically nontrivial computation, there must be at least one i for which knowing
gives Bob more information than knowing f (i, j) for just one value of j. As this violates the definition of security for a secure classical computation, it is impossible to implement any cryptographically nontrivial computation securely. Lo's proof as stated applies to non-relativistic protocols, and extends trivially to relativistic protocols. We hence conclude that all secure two-input deterministic one-sided cryptographically nontrivial computations are impossible. Lo also noted that some secure two-input deterministic, two-sided non-relativistic quantum computations are impossible, because they imply the ability to do non-trivial secure two-input, deterministic one-sided computations. This argument also extends trivially to relativistic protocols.
As far as we are aware, neither existence nor no-go results are presently known for secure two-input non-deterministic computations. Table I summarizes these results.
II. VARIABLE BIAS COIN TOSSING

A. Introduction
We now specialize to the task of variable bias coin tossing (VBCT), the simplest case of a one-input, random, two-sided computation. We seek protocols whose security is guaranteed based on the laws of physics. We distinguish relativistic protocols, which rely on the impossibility of superluminal signalling, from non-relativistic protocols, which do not. We also distinguish quantum protocols, which require quantum information to be generated and exchanged, from classical protocols, which can be implemented using classical information alone.
The aim of a VBCT protocol is to provide two mistrustful parties with the outcome of a biased coin toss. We label the possible outcomes by 0 and 1 and define the bias to be the probability p 0 of outcome 0. The protocol should allow one party, by convention Bob, to fix the bias to take any value within a pre-agreed range, p min ≤ p 0 ≤ p max . Roughly speaking -modulo epsilonics and technicalities which we discuss below -the protocol should guarantee to both parties that the biased coin toss outcome is genuinely random, in the sense that Bob's only way of influencing the outcome probabilities is through choosing the bias, while Alice has no way of influencing the outcome probabilities at all. It should also guarantee to Bob that Alice can obtain no information about his bias choice beyond what she can infer from the coin toss outcome alone.
To illustrate the uses of VBCT, consider a situation in which Bob may or may not wish to accept Alice's invitation to a party, in a future world in which social protocol decrees that his decision 1 is determined by a variable bias coin toss in which he chooses the bias within a prescribed range, let us say
11 . Alice, who is both self-confident and a Bayesian, believes prior to the coin toss that the probability of Bob not wishing to accept is 10 −n , for some fairly large value of n. If Bob does indeed wish to accept, he can choose p 0 = 10 11 , ensuring a high probability of acceptance. If he does not, he can choose p 0 = 1 11 , ensuring a low probability of acceptance. If the invitation is declined, this social protocol allows both parties to express regret, ascribing the outcome to bad luck rather than to Bob's wishes. Alice's posterior probability estimate of Bob's not wishing to attend is approximately 10 −n+1 , i.e. still close to zero. For another illustration of the uses of VBCT, suppose that Bob has a large secret binary dataset of size N . For example, this might be a binary encoding of a high resolution satellite image. He is willing to sell Alice a noisy image of the dataset with a specified level of random noise. Alice is willing to purchase if there is some way of guaranteeing, at least to within tolerable bounds, that the noise is at the specified level and that it was genuinely randomly generated. In particular, she would like some guarantee that constrains Bob so that he cannot selectively choose the noise so as to obscure a significantly sized component of the dataset which he (but not necessarily she) knows to be especially interesting. Let us suppose also that the full dataset will eventually become public, so that Alice will be able to check the noisy image against it, and that she will be able to enforce suitably large penalties against Bob if the noisy and true versions turn out not to be appropriately related. They may proceed by agreeing parameters p min and p max = 1 − p min , and then running a variable bias coin toss for each bit in the image, with Bob choosing p 0 = p min if the bit is 1 and p 0 = p max if the bit is 0. Following this protocol honestly provides Alice with the required randomly generated noisy image. On the other hand, if Bob deviates significantly from these choices for more than O( √ N ) of the bits, Alice will almost certainly be able to unmask his cheating once she acquires the full dataset.
B. Definitions
A VBCT protocol is defined by a prescribed series of classical or quantum communications between two parties, Alice and Bob. If the protocol is relativistic, it may also require that the parties each occupy two or more appropriately located sites, and may stipulate which sites each communication should be made from and to. The protocol's definition includes bias parameters p min and p max , with p min < p max , and may also include one or more security parameters N 1 , . . . , N r . It accepts a one bit input from one party, Bob, and must result in both parties receiving the same output, one of the three possibilities 0, 1 or "abort". The output "abort" can arise only if at least one of the parties refuses to complete the protocol honestly.
We follow the convention that Bob can fix p to be p min or p max by choosing inputs 1 or 0 respectively (so that an input of bit value b maximizes the probability of output b). He can thus fix p anywhere in the range p min ≤ p ≤ p max by choosing the input randomly with an appropriate weighting. Since any VBCT protocol gives Bob this freedom, we do not require a perfectly secure protocol to exclude other strategies which have the same result: i.e. a perfectly secure protocol may allow any strategy of Bob's which causes p 0 to lie in the given range, so long as no other security condition is violated.
2 This motivates the following security definitions. We say the protocol is secure if the following conditions hold when at least one party honestly follows the protocol. Let p 0 be the probability of the output being 0, and p 1 be the probability of the output being 1. Then, regardless of the strategy that a dishonest party may follow during the protocol, we have p 0 ≤ p + ǫ(N 1 , . . . , N r ) and
, where p min ≤ p ≤ p max and the protocol allows Bob to determine p to take any value in this range. Alice has probability less than ζ(N 1 , . . . , N r ) of obtaining more than I + δ(N 1 , . . . , N r ) bits of information about the value of p determined by Bob's input, where I is the information implied by the coin toss outcome. In addition, if Bob honestly follows the protocol and legitimately aborts before the coin toss outcome is known 3 , then Alice has probability less than ζ(N 1 , . . . , N r ) of obtaining more than δ(N 1 , . . . , N r ) bits of information about Bob's input.
(We should comment here on a technical detail that will be relevant to some of the protocols we later consider. It turns out, in some of our protocols, to be possible and useful for Bob to make supplementary security tests even after both parties have received information which would determine the coin toss outcome. The protocols are secure whether or not these supplementary tests are made, in the sense that the security criteria hold as the security parameters tend to infinity. However, the supplementary tests increase the level of security for any fixed finite value of the security parameters.
We need slightly modified definitions to cover this case, since the output of the protocol is defined to be "abort" if Bob aborts after carrying out supplementary security tests. If Bob honestly follows a protocol with supplementary tests, and legitimately aborts after the coin toss outcome is determined, then we require that Alice should have probability less than ζ(N 1 , . . . , N r ) of obtaining more than δ(N 1 , . . . , N r ) extra bits of information -i.e. beyond what is implied by the coin toss outcome -about Bob's input.
Note that introducing supplementary security tests may allow Alice to follow the protocol honestly until she obtains the coin toss outcome, and then deliberately fail the supplementary tests in order to cause the protocol to abort. However, this gives her no useful extra scope for cheating. In any type of VBCT protocol, she can always follow the protocol honestly and then refuse to abide by the outcome: for example, she can decide not to invite Bob to her party, even if the variable bias coin toss suggests that she should. This unavoidable possibility has the same effect as her causing the protocol to abort after the coin toss outcome is determined.)
In all the above cases, we require δ(N 1 , . . . , N r ) → 0, ǫ(N 1 , . . . , N r ) → 0 and ζ(N 1 , . . . , N r ) → 0 as the N i → ∞. We say the protocol is perfectly secure for some fixed values N 1 , . . . , N r if the above conditions hold with ǫ(N 1 , . . . , N r ) = δ(N 1 , . . . , N r ) = ζ(N 1 , . . . , N r ) = 0.
Suppose now that one party is honest and the other party fixes their strategy (which may be probabilistic and may depend on data received during the protocol) before the protocol commences, and suppose that the probability of the protocol aborting, given this strategy, is less than ǫ ′ . Since the only possible outcomes are 0, 1 and "abort", it follows from the above conditions that, if Bob inputs 1, we have
. . , N r ). In other words, unless a dishonest party is willing to accept a significant risk of the protocol aborting, they cannot cause the outcome probabilities for 0 or 1 to be significantly outside the allowed range. Moreover, no aborting strategy can increase the probability of 0 or 1 beyond the allowed maximum.
For an unconditionally secure VBCT protocol, the above conditions hold assuming only that the laws of physics are correct. In a cheat-evidently secure protocol, if any of the above conditions fail, then the non-cheating party is guaranteed to detect this, again assuming only the validity of the laws of physics.
III. SOME CRYPTOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND
The VBCT protocols we discuss below require both parties to set up separated sites from which they can send and receive communications, and rely on the impossibility of sending signals faster than light between these sites. Most of them also require quantum information to be transmitted and manipulated. In other words, the protocols are (in most cases) both quantum and relativistic.
Some of the protocols we consider use bit commitment as a subprotocol. Specifically, they use the relativistic bit commitment protocol RBC2 described in Ref. [19] . This protocol has been proven secure against all classical attacks. It has also been proven immune to the Mayers-Lo-Chau attack which renders non-relativistic quantum bit commitment protocols insecure [19] . It is conjectured to be secure against general quantum attacks.
For completeness, we include here brief reviews of the simplest scenario for relativistic cryptography and of the notion of bit commitment, as previously set out in Ref. [19] .
A. Review of relativistic cryptography
We assume that physics takes place in flat Minkowski spacetime, with the Minkowski causal structure. This is not exactly correct, of course -general relativity and experiment tell us that spacetime is curved -but it is true to a good enough approximation for any protocol implemented on or near Earth. In principle, our protocol's timing constraints should take into account the error in the approximation. Other than this, the known corrections to the local causal structure arising from general relativity do not affect our security analyses.
Like all physics-based cryptographic protocols, the security of the relativistic protocols we consider ultimately relies on the (approximate) validity of the underlying physical model. In principle, they would be vulnerable to a malicious adversary with the power to distort spacetime significantly (yet surreptitiously!) in the region of the protocol. For example, a protocol using separated sites in London and Sydney would be vulnerable if one party reconfigured the local spacetime geometry so that the two cities became geodesically separated by, say, ≈ 10 −3 light sec instead of ≈ 4 × 10 −2 light sec. For obvious reasons, we do not take this possibility -or other scenarios involving exotic and speculative general relativistic phenomena [18] -seriously at present.
We use units in which the speed of light is unity and choose inertial coordinates, so that the minimum possible time for a light signal to go from one point in space to another is equal to their spatial separation. We consider a cryptographic scenario in which coordinates are agreed by Alice and Bob, who also agree on two points 4 x 1 and x 2 . Alice and Bob are required to erect laboratories, including sending and receiving stations, within an agreed distance δ of the points, where D = |x 1 − x 2 | ≫ δ. These laboratories need not be restricted in size or shape, except that they must not overlap.
We refer to the laboratories in the vicinity of x i as A i and B i , for i = 1 or 2. To avoid unnecessarily proliferating notation, we use the same labels for the agents (sentient or otherwise) assumed to be occupying these laboratories. The agents A 1 and A 2 may be separate individuals or devices, but we assume that they are collaborating with complete mutual trust and with completely prearranged agreements on how to proceed, to the extent that for cryptanalytic purposes we can identify them together simply as a single entity, Alice (A); similarly B 1 and B 2 are identified as Bob (B).
Note that, in many situations where any sort of cryptography (not necessarily quantum or relativistic) is employed, this sort of identification is in any case natural and indeed necessary. Governments, companies and other organizations are represented by many agents at distributed locations. When two such organizations, A and B, exchange data via a cryptographic protocol, each organization typically has to assume that several of its own agents are trustworthy. The aim of the protocol is then to ensure that, provided this assumption this correct, neither organization obtains unauthorized information from the other.
It is perhaps also worth stressing that requiring A and B to trust their own agents or devices is entirely different from introducing a third party trusted by both A and B. While the first assumption (which we make) is natural and often necessary, the second (which, to reiterate, we do not allow) would be illegitimate in the context of the present discussion. (Many mistrustful cryptographic tasks, including all those we consider here, can be trivially implemented if A and B can both rely on the same trusted third party.)
As usual in defining a cryptographic scenario for a protocol between mistrustful parties, we suppose Alice and Bob each trust absolutely the security and integrity of their own laboratories, in the sense that they are confident that all their sending, receiving and analysing devices function properly and also that nothing within their laboratories can be observed by outsiders. They also have confidence in the locations of their own laboratories in the agreed coordinate system, and in clocks set up within their laboratories. However, neither of them trusts any third party or channel or device outside their own laboratory.
To ensure in advance that their clocks are synchronized and that their communication channels transmit at sufficiently near light speed, the parties may check that test signals sent out from each of Bob's laboratories receive a response within time 4δ from Alice's neighbouring laboratory, and vice versa. However, the parties need not disclose the precise locations of their laboratories in order to implement the protocol. Nor need Alice or Bob take it on trust that the other has set up laboratories in the stipulated regions. (A protocol which required such trust would, of course, be fatally flawed.) Each party can verify that the other is not significantly deviating from the protocol by checking the times at which signals from the other party arrive. These arrival times, together with the times of their own transmissions, can be used to guarantee that particular specified pairs of signals, going from Alice to Bob and from Bob to Alice, were generated independently. This guarantee is all that is required for security.
Given a laboratory configuration as above, one can set out precise timing constraints for all communications in a protocol in order to ensure the independence of all pairs of signals which are required to be generated independently. We may use the time coordinate in the agreed frame to order the signals in the protocol. (Without such a convention there would be some ambiguity, since the time ordering is frame dependent).
We also assume that A 1 and A 2 either have, or can securely generate, an indefinite string of random bits. This string is independently generated and identically distributed, with probability distribution defined by the protocol, and is denoted x ≡ {x i }. Similarly, B 1 and B 2 share a random string y ≡ {y i }. These random strings will be used to make all random choices as required by the protocol: as A 1 and A 2 , for instance, both possess the same string, x, they know the outcome of any random choices made during the protocol by the other. We also assume the existence of secure authenticated pairwise channels between the A i and between the B i . We do not assume that these channels are necessarily unjammable: we need only stipulate that, if an honest party fails to receive the signals as required during any of the protocols we discuss, they abort the protocol.
B. Brief review of bit commitment
Roughly speaking -precise definitions can be found in, for example, Ref. [19] -bit commitment is the cryptographic version of a safe and key. In the commitment phase of a bit commitment protocol, Alice supplies Bob with data that commit her to the value of a bit, without allowing Bob to infer that value. This corresponds to locking the bit in the safe and handing it to Bob. In the unveiling phase, which takes place some time after commitment, if and when Alice wishes, she supplies Bob with further data (the key in our analogy) in order to reveal the value of the bit to which she committed.
Recently, it was shown [19] that there exist relativistic bit commitment protocols which are provably unconditionally secure against classical attack, in the sense that the laws of classical physics (including special relativity) imply that neither party can cheat, regardless of the technology or computing power available to them. Mayers, Lo and Chau had earlier shown [23, 24] that non-relativistic quantum bit commitment protocols are necessarily insecure, by constructing an explicit attack that allows the committer to cheat against any protocol which is secure against the receiver. However, it was shown in Ref. [19] that the relativistic bit commitment protocols described there are immune to Mayers-Lo-Chau type attacks. It is conjectured that they are in fact unconditionally secure, i.e. that they are immune to general quantum attacks.
IV. VBCT PROTOCOLS A. Protocol VBCT1
We consider first a simple relativistic quantum protocol, which implements VBCT with unconditional security, for a limited range of biases. The protocol requires each party to have agents located at three appropriately separated sites.
1. B 1 , B 2 and B 3 agree a random number n chosen from a Poisson distribution with large mean (or other suitable distribution).
2. A 1 sends a sequence of qubits {|φ i } to B 1 , where each |φ i ∈ {|ψ 0 , |ψ 1 } is chosen independently with probability half each, using the random string x. The states |ψ 0 and |ψ 1 are agreed between Alice and Bob prior to the protocol, and the qubits are sent at regular intervals according to a previously agreed schedule, so that all the agents involved can coordinate their transmissions.
3. B 1 receives each qubit and stores it. 7. B 1 performs the measurement on |φ n that optimally distinguishes |ψ 0 from |ψ 1 , and then reveals to A 1 that this is the state that will be used, along with a bit b. If his measurement is indicative of the state being |ψ b ′ , then Bob should select b = b ′ if he wants outcome 0, or else select b =b ′ . Let Alice's random choice for the nth state be |ψ a : recall that A 2 reported the value of a to B 2 in step 4.
8. Some time later, A 1 receives from A 3 the value of n sent by B 3 , confirming that B 1 was committed to guess the nth state, and B 1 receives from B 2 the value of a sent by A 2 . The outcome of the coin toss is c = a ⊕ b.
It will be seen that this protocol is a variant of the familiar relativistic protocol for ordinary coin tossing. As in that protocol, Alice and Bob simultaneously exchange random bits. However, Alice's bit is here encoded in non-orthogonal qubits, which means that Bob can obtain some information about its value. Bob uses this information to affect the bias of the coin toss.
We use the bit w to represent Bob's wishes, with w = 0 representing Bob trying to produce the outcome 0 by guessing correctly, and w = 1 representing him trying to produce the outcome 1 by guessing wrongly. Security requires that p(w|a, b, c) ≈ p(w|c) .
(1)
Perfect security requires equality in the above equation.
Bob's strategy
The choice of n need not be fixed by Bob at the start of the protocol: for example, it could be decided during the protocol by using an entangled state shared by the B i . However, we may assume B 3 sends a classical choice of n to A 3 (A 3 will measure any quantum state he sends immediately in the computational basis, and hence we may assume, for the purposes of security analysis, that B 3 carries out this measurement). B 3 's announcement of n is causally disconnected from the sending of the nth state to B 1 and of its identity to B 2 . Therefore, no matter how it is selected, it does not depend on the value of the nth state. While it could be generated in such a way as to depend on some information about the sequence of states previously received, these states are uncorrelated with the nth state if Alice follows the protocol. Such a strategy thus confers no advantage, and we may assume, for the purposes of security analysis, that the the choice of n is generated by an algorithm independent of the previous sequence of states. We may also assume that n is generated in such a way that B 1 and B 2 can obtain the value of n announced by B 3 with certainty: if not, their task is only made harder. In summary, for the purposes of security analysis, we may assume that B 3 announces a classical value of n, pre-agreed with B 1 and B 2 at the beginning of the protocol.
B 1 is then committed to making a guess of the value of the nth state: if he fails to do so then Alice knows Bob has cheated. B 1 's best strategy is thus to perform some measurement on the nth state and use the outcome to make his guess. We define |ψ 0 = cos . Let the projections defining the optimal measurement be P 0 and P 1 . We say that the outcome corresponding to P 0 is 'outcome 0', and similarly for the outcome corresponding to P 1 . Without loss of generality, we can take outcome 0 to correspond to the most likely state Alice sent being |ψ 0 and similarly outcome 1 to correspond to |ψ 1 . Bob's probability of guessing correctly is then given by,
This is maximized for P 0 and P 1 corresponding to measurements in the |± basis, where |± = 1 √ 2 (|0 ± |1 ). The maximum value is,
It is easy to see that the security criterion (1) is always satisfied. The minimum probability of Bob guessing correctly is always 1 − p max B , which he can attain by following the same strategy but associating outcome b ′ with a guess of b ′ . The possible range of biases are those between p min = 1 2 (1 + sin θ) and p max = 1 2 (1 − sin θ). The protocol thus implements VBCT for all values of p min and p max with p min + p max = 1 (and no others).
Security against Alice
Security against Alice is ensured by the fact that B 1 tests A 2 's statements about the identity of the states sent to B 1 .
We seek to show that if Alice attempts to alter the probability of B 1 measuring 0 or 1 with his measurement in step 7, then in the limit of large n, either the probability of her being detected tends to 1, or her probability of successfully altering the probability tends to zero. Note that it may be useful for Alice to alter the probabilities in either direction: if she increases the probability that B 1 guesses correctly, she learns more information about Bob's bias than she should; if she decreases it, she limits Bob's ability to affect the bias.
We need to show that if on the i-th round, B 1 receives state ρ i , for which the probability of outcome 0 differs from those dictated by the protocol, then the probability of B 1 not detecting Alice cheating on this state is strictly less than 1. B 1 's projections are onto {|+ , |− } for the nth state. Alice's cheating strategy must ensure that for some subset of the states she sends to B 1 , there is a different probability of his measurement giving outcome 0. Suppose that ρ i satisfies
where δ 1 , δ 2 = 0. Then, if B 1 was to instead test Alice's honesty, the state which maximizes the probability of Alice passing the test, among those satisfying (4), is
and she should declare this state to be whichever of |φ 0 or |φ 1 maximizes the probability of passing Bob's test. We have
and a similar equation with p min replacing p max and δ 2 replacing δ 1 . Hence the probability of passing Bob's test is at most 1 − δ 2 , where δ = min(|δ 1 |, |δ 2 |). In order to affect B 1 's measurement probabilities with significant chance of success, there must be a significant fraction of states satisfying (4) . If a fraction γ of states satisfy (4) with min(|δ 1 |, |δ 2 |) ≥ δ for some fixed δ > 0, then this cheating strategy succeeds with probability at most γ(1 − δ 2 ) γn . Hence, for any δ, γ, the probability of this technique being successful for Alice can be made arbitrarily close to 0 if Bob chooses the mean of the Poisson distribution used in step 1 (and hence the expected value of n) to be sufficiently large.
Note that, as this argument applies state by state to the ρ i , it covers every possible strategy of Alice's: in particular, the argument holds whether or not the sequence of qubits she sends is entangled.
We hence conclude that the protocol is asymptotically secure against Alice.
B. Protocol VBCT2
We now present a relativistic quantum VBCT protocol which allows any range of biases, but achieves only cheatevident security rather than unconditional security.
1. B 1 creates N states, each being either |ψ 0 = α 0 |00 + β 0 |11 or |ψ 1 = α 1 |00 + β 1 |11 , with {α 0 , α 1 , β 0 , β 1 } ∈ R + , α The states are chosen with probability half each. In the unlikely event that all the states are the same, B 1 rejects this batch and starts again. B 1 uses the shared random string y to make his random choices, so that B 1 and B 2 both know the identity of the i-th state. B 1 sends the second qubit of each state to A 1 . The values of α 0 , β 0 , α 1 and β 1 are known to both Alice and Bob. We define the bias of the state |ψ i to be α can then verify that they are as claimed and if so, the protocol returns to step 1. If not, she aborts the protocol.
(b) If z = 0, B 1 randomly chooses a state to use for the coin toss from amongst those with the bias he wants. B 2 simultaneously informs A 2 of B 1 's choice. 4 . A 1 and B 1 measure their halves of the chosen state in the {|0 , |1 } basis, and this defines the outcome of the coin toss.
(5. As an optional supplementary post coin toss security test, B 1 may ask A 1 to send all her remaining qubits back to him, except for her half of the state selected for the coin toss. He can then perform projective measurements on these states to check that they correspond to those originally sent.)
An intuitive argument for security of this protocol is as follows. On the one hand, as M → ∞, the protocol is secure against Bob since, in this limit, he always has to convince Alice that he supplied the right states which he can only do if he has been honest. But also, in the limit N → ∞, we expect the protocol to be secure against Alice, since in this limit, she cannot gain any more information about the bias Bob selected than can be gained by performing the honest measurement.
The protocol can only provide cheat-evident security rather than unconditional security, since there are useful cheating strategies open to Alice, albeit ones which will certainly be detected. One such strategy is for A 1 to claim that z = 0 on some state, while A 2 claims that z = 1. This allows Alice to determine Bob's desired bias, since B 1 will tell A 1 the state to use, and B 2 will tell A 2 its identity. However, this cheating attack will be exposed once B 1 and B 2 communicate.
(Technically, Alice has another possible attack: she can follow the protocol honestly until she learns the outcome, and then intentionally try to fail Bob's tests in step 5 by altering her halves of the remaining states in some way. By so doing, she can cause the protocol to abort after the coin toss outcome is determined. However, as discussed in Section II, this gives her no advantage.)
Security against Alice
Assume Bob does not deviate from the protocol. A 2 must announce the value of z without any information about the current batch of states sent to A 1 by B 1 . Alice therefore cannot affect the bias: once a given batch is accepted, she cannot affect B 1 's measurement probabilities on any state he chooses for the coin toss. While Alice's choices of z need not be classical bits determined before the protocol and shared by the A i , we may assume, for the purposes of security analysis, that they are, by the same argument used in analysing Bob's choice of n in VBCT1.
Once Bob has announced the state he wishes to use for the coin toss, though, Alice can perform any measurement on the states in her possession in order to gain information about Bob's chosen bias. It would be sufficient to show that any such attack that provides significant information is almost certain to be detected by Bob's tests in step 3b; if so, the existence of such attacks would not compromise the cheat-evident security of the protocol. In fact, a stronger result holds: Alice cannot gain significant information by such attacks. From her perspective, if Bob selects a |ψ 0 state for the coin toss, the (un-normalized) mixed state of the remaining (N − 1) qubits is,
while if Bob selects a |ψ 1 state for the coin toss, the (un-normalized) mixed state of the remaining (N − 1) qubits is
where
We will use σ 0 and σ 1 to denote the normalized versions ofσ 0 andσ 1 respectively. We have
where D(ρ, σ) = 1 2 tr|ρ − σ| is the trace distance between ρ and σ. As N → ∞, we have D(σ 0 , σ 1 ) → 0 and so ρ 1 ) . Since the maximum probability of distinguishing two states is a function only of the trace distance [27] , the maximum probability of distinguishing ρ 0 ⊗ σ 0 from ρ 1 ⊗ σ 1 tends, as N → ∞, to the maximum probability of distinguishing ρ 0 from ρ 1 . The measurement that attains this maximum is that dictated by the protocol. We hence conclude that, in the limit of large N , the excess information Alice can gain on Bob's chosen bias by using any cheating strategy tends to zero.
Security against Bob
We now consider Bob's cheating possibilities, assuming that Alice does not deviate from the protocol. To cheat, Bob must achieve a bias outside the range permitted. Let us suppose he wants to ensure that the outcome probability of 0 satisfies p 0 ≥ p max + δ, for some δ > 0 (the case p 1 ≥ 1 − p min + δ can be treated similarly), and let us suppose this can be achieved with probability δ ′ > 0. For this to be the case, there must be some cheating strategy (possibly including measurements) which, with probability δ ′ , allows B 2 to identify a choice of i from the relevant batch of N qubits such that the state ρ i of A 1 's i-th qubit then satisfies
If A 1 's i-th qubit does indeed have this property, and she chooses to test Bob's honesty on the relevant batch, the probability of the i-th qubit passing the test is at most 1 − δ 2 . To see this, note that if (12) holds, the probability of passing the test is maximized if the i-th state is
and B 1 declares that the i-th state is |ψ 0 . The probability is then
However, the probability of A 1 's measurement outcomes is independent of B 2 's actions. Hence this bound applies whether or not B 2 actually implements a cheating strategy on the relevant batch. Thus there must be a probability of at least δ ′ δ 2 of at least one member of the batch failing A 1 's tests. Hence, for any given δ, δ ′ > 0, the probability that one of the ≈ 2 M batches for which z = 1 fails A 1 's tests can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by taking M sufficiently large.
C. Protocol VBCT3
The protocol VBCT2 can be improved by using bit commitment subprotocols to keep Bob's choice of state secret until he is able to compare the values of z announced by A 1 and A 2 . This eliminates the cheat-evident attack discussed in the last section, and defines a protocol which we conjecture is unconditionally secure. We use the relativistic bit commitment protocol RBC2, defined and reviewed in Ref. [19] .
1. B 1 creates N states, each being either |ψ 0 = α 0 |00 + β 0 |11 or |ψ 1 = α 1 |00 + β 1 |11 , with {α 0 , α 1 , β 0 , β 1 } ∈ R + , and α
The states are chosen with probability half each. B 1 and B 2 both know the identity of the i-th state, since B 1 uses the shared random string y to make his random choices. B 1 sends the second qubit of each state to A 1 . The values of α 0 , β 0 , α 1 and β 1 are known to both Alice and Bob.
2. Alice decides whether to test Bob's honesty, which she codes by choosing the bit value z = 1, or to trust him, coded by z = 0. She selects z = 0 with probability 2 −M . A 1 and A 2 simultaneously inform B 1 and B 2 of the choice of z.
3. B 1 and B 2 broadcast the value of z they received to one another. , by which point they have received the signals sent in step 3. They then check that the z values they received from the A i are the same. If not, they abort the protocol.
8. B 1 and B 2 send communications to A 1 and A 2 which unveil the value of i to which they were committed, and hence reveal the state chosen for the coin toss. If the unveiling is invalid, Alice aborts.
9. A 1 and B 1 measure their halves of the i-th state in the {|0 , |1 } basis to define the outcome of the coin toss.
(10. As an optional supplementary post coin toss security test, B 1 asks A 1 to return her qubits from all states other than the i-th. He then tests that the returned states are those originally sent, by carrying out appropriate projective measurements. If the tests fail, he aborts the protocol.)
Security against Alice
In this modification of protocol VBCT2, there is no longer any advantage to Alice in cheating by arranging that one of the A i sends z = 0 and the other z = 1. Such an attack will be detected with certainty, as is the case with protocol VBCT2. Moreover, since Bob's chosen value of i is encrypted by a bit commitment, which is only unveiled once the B i have checked that the values of z they received are identical, Alice gains no information about Bob's chosen bias from the attack. The bit commitment subprotocol RBC2 is unconditionally secure against Alice [19] , since the communications she receive are, from her perspective, uniformly distributed random strings.
(As in the case of VBCT2, technically speaking, Alice has another possible attack: she can follow the protocol honestly up to step 10 and then, once she learns Bob's chosen state, intentionally try to fail Bob's tests by altering her halves of the remaining states in some way. By so doing, she can cause the protocol to abort after the coin toss outcome is known. Again, though, this gives her no advantage.)
The protocol therefore presents Alice with no useful cheating attack.
Security against Bob
Intuitively, one might expect the proof that VBCT2 is secure against Bob to carry over to a proof that VBCT3 is similarly secure, for the following reasons. First, the only difference between the two protocols is that Bob makes a commitment to the value of i rather than announcing it immediately, Second, when the bit commitment protocol RBC2 is used, as here, just for a single round of communications, it is provably unconditionally secure against general (classical or quantum) attacks by Bob.
To make this argument rigorous, one would need to show that RBC2 and the other elements of VBCT3 are securely composable in an appropriate sense: i.e. that Bob has no collective quantum attack which allows him to generate and manipulate collectively data used in the various steps of VBCT3 in such a way as to cheat. We conjecture that this is indeed the case, but have no proof.
D. Protocol VBCT4
Classical communications and information processing are generally less costly than their quantum counterparts, so much so that in some circumstances it is reasonable to treat classical resources as essentially cost-free compared to quantum resources. It is thus interesting to note the existence of a classical relativistic protocol for VBCT, which is unconditionally secure against classical attacks, and which we conjecture is unconditionally secure against quantum attacks. The protocol requires Alice and Bob each to have two appropriately located agents, A 1 , A 2 and B 1 , B 2 .
1. Bob generates a 2M × N matrix of bits such that each row contains either α 2 0 N zero entries or α 2 1 N zero entries, these being positioned randomly throughout the row. The rows are arranged in pairs, so that, for m from 0 to (M − 1), either the 2m-th row contains α 2 0 N entries and the (2m + 1)-th contains α 2 1 N , or vice versa. This choice is made randomly, equiprobably, and independently for each pair. The matrix is known to both B 1 and B 2 but kept secret from Alice.
2. Bob then commits each element of the matrix separately to Alice using the classically secure relativistic bit commitment subprotocol RBC2 [19] , initiated by communications between A 2 and B 2 .
3. A 1 then picks M − 1 pairs at random. She asks B 1 to unveil Bob's commitment for all of the bits in these pairs of rows.
4. The RBC2 commitments for the remaining bits are sustained while A 1 and A 2 communicate to verify that each unveiling corresponds to a valid commitment to either 0 or 1. Alice also checks that each unveiled pair contains one row with α simultaneously picks a random column. They inform A 1 and B 2 respectively, thus identifying a single matrix element belonging to the intersection.
6. Bob then unveils this bit, which is used as the outcome of the coin toss. The remaining commitments are never unveiled.
Security
The above protocol shows that, classically, bit commitment can be used as a subprotocol to achieve VBCT. The proof that RBC2 is unconditionally secure against classical attacks [19] can be extended to show that Protocol VBCT4 is similarly secure. RBC2 is conjectured, but not proven, to be secure against general quantum attacks. We conjecture, but have no proof, that the same is true of Protocol VBCT4.
V. SUMMARY
We have defined the task of variable bias coin tossing (VBCT), illustrated its use with a couple of applications, and presented four VBCT protocols. Of these the first, VBCT1, allows VBCT for a limited range of biases, and is unconditionally secure against general quantum attacks. The second protocol, VBCT2, is defined for any range of biases and guarantees cheat-evident security against general quantum attacks. The third, VBCT3, extends the second by using a relativistic bit commitment subprotocol, and we conjecture that it is unconditionally secure against general quantum attacks.
The fourth protocol, VBCT4, is classical, and is based on multiple uses of a classical relativistic bit commitment scheme which is proven secure against classical attacks. It can be shown to be unconditionally secure against classical attacks. The relevant relativistic bit commitment scheme is conjectured secure against quantum attacks, and we conjecture that this is also true of Protocol VBCT4.
Variable bias coin tossing is a simple example of a random one-input two-sided secure computation. The most general such computation is what we have termed a variable bias n-faced die roll. In this case, there is a finite range of n outputs, with each of Bob's inputs leading to a different probability distribution over these outputs. In other words, Bob is effectively allowed to choose one of a fixed set of biased n-faced dice to generate the output, while Alice is guaranteed that Bob's chosen dice is restricted to the agreed set.
The protocols VBCT2, VBCT3 and VBCT4 can easily be generalized to protocols defining variable bias n-faced die rolls. Thus, to adapt protocols VBCT2 and VBCT3 to variable bias die rolling, we require Bob to choose a series of states from the set {|ψ i = 2 defines the probability of outcome j for the i-th dice (we take {α j i } to be real and positive). The protocols then proceed similarly to those given above, defining protocols which we conjecture to be cheat-evidently secure and unconditionally secure respectively.
To adapt protocol VBCT4, we require that the matrix rows contain appropriate proportions of entries corresponding to the various possible die roll outcomes. We conjecture that this protocol is unconditionally secure.
As we noted earlier, variable bias n-sided die rolling is the most general one-input random two-sided two party single function computation. Our conjectures, if proven, would thus imply that all such computations can be implemented with unconditional security.
